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NOTES/CLE MATERIALS




In North Carolina, a plaintiff filing a medical malpractice claim
must meet the certification requirements of Rule 9(j) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure) Potential plaintiffs who cannot
meet North Carolina's certification requirements to bring a medical
malpractice action may soon have a new avenue of relief. On March
6, 2008, the Supreme Court of North Carolina (the Court) granted
discretionary review of the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision
in Grant v. High Point Regional Health System.2 On October 10, 2008,
the Court issued another decision ruling that discretionary review of
the case was improvidently granted.' By following the North Carolina
Court of Appeals' decision in Grant, injured claimants who, by no
fault of their own, cannot secure certification for a malpractice action
may be able to receive compensation by way of a tort claim for com-
mon law obstruction of justice.4
In Grant, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the plain-
tiff successfully stated a claim for common law obstruction of justice.5
Quoting the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the Court of Appeals
stated, "[a]t common law, it is an offense to do any act which prevents,
obstructs, impedes or hinders public or legal justice."6 Plaintiff pur-
* B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel-Hill, The School of Journalism and Mass
Communication, 2006; J.D. (cand.) North Carolina Central University School of Law, 2010. I
would like to thank Josh Starin for his comments and guidance for this casenote. I dedicate this
casenote to my parents, Cindy and Willie Coleman, for their love and support, now and always.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (2008).
2. Grant v. High Point Reg'l Health Sys., 362 N.C. 234, 234, 659 S.E.2d 441, 441 (2008).
3. Grant v. High Point Reg'l Health Sys., 362 N.C. 502, 502, 666 S.E.2d 757, 757 (2008)
(per curiam).
4. Grant v. High Point Reg'l Health Sys., 184 N.C. App. 250, 255-56, 645 S.E.2d 851, 855
(2007), disc. rev. granted, 362 N.C. 234, 234, 659 S.E.2d 441, 441 (2008), disc. rev. improvidently
granted per curiam, 362 N.C. 502, 666 S.E.2d 757.
5. Grant, 184 N.C. App. at 255-56, 645 S.E.2d at 855.
6. Id. at 253, 645 S.E.2d at 853 (quoting In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 670, 309 S.E.2d 442, 462
(1983)).
1
Coleman: A New Route to Medical Malpractice in North Carolina
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
sued the obstruction action after the Hospital allegedly prevented her
from receiving the Rule 90)7 certification required to bring a claim for
medical malpractice.8 Grant's claim for damages included all those
damages which could be demanded in an action for medical
malpractice.9
This note first focuses on the Grant case and the relatively limited
history of civil claims of common law obstruction of justice in North
Carolina. The facts and holdings of the cases are explained in detail in
order to demonstrate the circumstances under which the North Caro-
lina appellate courts have previously recognized a civil claim for com-
mon law obstruction of justice. The note then discusses the feasibility
of a tort action for common law obstruction in cases similar to Grant.
Finally, the note considers possible judicial standards that the Court
could set forth if the Court chooses to recognize this new tort claim.
THE CASE
Betty L. Grant, executrix of the estate of Tommy J. Grant (dece-
dent), brought claims against High Point Regional Health System
(Hospital) for common law obstruction of justice and common law
spoliation of evidence. 10 Grant alleged that decedent visited the Hos-
pital's emergency room on or around September 13, 2000 while exper-
iencing excruciating knee pain.11 Decedent was later diagnosed with
cancer.1 2 At the time of the diagnosis, the cancer had advanced to a
terminal stage. 3 Decedent died on February 17, 2003.14
An attorney for Grant sent the hospital a letter on August 31,
2003.1 The letter notified the hospital of a potential medical negli-
gence claim. 6 Additionally, the letter requested production of medi-
cal records, including x-rays, from June 1 through December 31,
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §1A-1, Rule 90) (2008) (Under this rule, a claim for medical malprac-
tice will be dismissed unless, "(1) the pleading specifically asserts that the medical care has been
reviewed by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702
of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with
the applicable standard of care, (2) the pleading specifically asserts that the medical care has
been reviewed by a person that the complainant will see to have qualified as an expert W by
motion under Rule 702(e) of the Rules of Evidence and is willing to testify that the medical care
did not comply with the applicable standard of care, and the motion is filed with the complaint;
or (3) the pleading alleges facts establishing negligence under the existing common-law doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur").
8. Grant, 184 N.C. App. at 251-52, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
9. Id. at 252, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
10. Id.
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2000.17 The Hospital did not respond to the request for records. 18 On
September 15, 2003, Grant's attorney had a telephone conversation
with a hospital employee named "Rose" regarding the request for
records.' 9 Rose told the attorney that the original request had not
been received, and that the records were available in decedent's file.20
Rose additionally suggested that the attorney send a new medical re-
lease form to place in decedent's file.2 On September 23, 2003, after
sending a new release form and failing to hear from Rose or any other
hospital employee, Grant's attorney called Rose a second time.22
Rose informed Grant's attorney that she was unable to locate the
medical records.23
After attempting unsuccessfully to obtain decedent's medical
records for several months following the telephone conversation,
Grant's attorney sent the Hospital a subpoena to produce the
records.24 On January 20, 2004, the Hospital informed Grant that the
records were not in decedent's file and had not been checked out.25
Grant further alleged that, after being put on notice of a potential
medical negligence claim, the Hospital intentionally destroyed dece-
dent's records. 26 Grant claimed that the actions taken by the Hospital
rendered her unable to bring a successful suit for medical malpractice
against the Hospital and others involved in decedent's care.27 Grant
also alleged that the missing x-rays prevented Grant from receiving
Rule 9(j) certification as required to pursue a medical malpractice
action.28
As a result of the Hospital's alleged behavior, Grant claimed as
damages:
actual damages, including but not limited to all damages she could
have recovered for wrongful death and medical negligence- i.e. medi-
cal expenses, funeral expenses, pain and suffering, loss of services,
protection, care and assistance, society, companionship, conform and
guidance, kindly offices and advice.29










26. Id. at 252, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
27. Id. at 251, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
28. Id. at 251-52, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
29. Id. at 252, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
30. Id.
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The trial court granted the Hospital's motion to dismiss the claims
of common law spoliation of evidence and common law obstruction of
justice on February 10, 2006.31 On review, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals reversed in part.3 2 The court held that Grant had suffi-
ciently stated a claim for common law obstruction of justice, but that
the Hospital's alleged conduct did not constitute common law spolia-
tion of evidence.33
BACKGROUND
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the common law
offense of obstruction of justice as a cognizable civil claim in the 2001
case of Burgess v. Busby.3 4 Prior to Burgess, a claim of obstruction of
justice was discussed twice in civil matters heard by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina.35
The earlier of the cases, In re Kivett, concerned a superior court
judge who was under investigation and recommended for removal.36
Common law obstruction of justice was among the many claims that
served as a basis for removal. 37 The facts of Kivett indicated that the
judge in question attempted to prevent the convening of a grand jury
against his interests.38 The judge called a fellow superior court judge
and asked that he issue a restraining order to stop the grand jury from
meeting as scheduled. 39 The Supreme Court found that these actions
formed a sufficient basis for a claim of obstruction of justice. n
In defining obstruction of justice, the Supreme Court explained, "at
common law it is an offense to do any act which prevents, obstructs,
impedes or hinders public or legal justice." 4 ' Article 30 of Chapter 14
of the North Carolina General Statutes lists specific activities which
constitute obstruction of justice.42 The court in Kivett opined that
common law offenses, which are neither contradicted nor abrogated
by statute remain cognizable in North Carolina.43 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 4-1, which allows:
31. Id.
32. Id. at 258, 645 S.E.2d at 857.
33. Id.
34. Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 544 S.E.2d 4 (2001).
35. See In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 309 S.E.2d 442 (1983); Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 310
S.E.2d 326 (1984).
36. Kivett, 309 N.C. at 637, 309 S.E.2d at 443.
37. Id. at 670, 309 S.E.2d at 462.
38. Id. at 642, 309 S.E.2d at 446.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 670, 309 S.E.2d at 462.
41. Id.
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-221 to -227 (2008).
43. Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670, 309 S.E.2d at 462.
20091
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol31/iss2/5
202 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:198
such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use
within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive
of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and indepen-
dence of this State and the form of government therein established,
and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not
abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in
full force within this State.4
The court noted that "the common law offense of obstruction of jus-
tice may take a variety of forms, '45 and concluded that the actions of
the judge under investigation were included in those various forms.46
The second North Carolina Supreme Court case addressing com-
mon law obstruction of justice in a civil action was Henry v. Deen.47
In Deen, the administrator of Archie Lee Henry's (decedent) estate
brought an action for medical malpractice and civil conspiracy against
two physicians and a physician's assistant (defendants) as a result of
decedent's allegedly wrongful death.48
Decedent visited the emergency room at Anson County Hospital
after experiencing pain, discomfort, nausea and trouble breathing.49
The attending physician in the emergency room diagnosed decedent
with pneumonia and advised that decedent follow-up with defendant
Deen if his discomfort persisted. The emergency room staff re-
viewed x-rays of the decedent's chest after his visit and noted poten-
tial deterioration in his heart.5' The physician contacted decedent and
advised that he should see Deen for a complete medical evaluation.52
After his symptoms persisted, decedent visited Deen's office, where
defendants Deen and Hall gave decedent a mere "cursory examina-
tion" and advised decedent to continue taking pneumonia medica-
tion.53 The decedent died on July 8, 1979 of massive myocardial
infarction as a result of heart disease. 4
In support of the claim of civil conspiracy, the administrator of de-
cedent's estate alleged that, after decedent's death, defendants Deen,
Hall and Niazi initiated a conspiracy.55 The complaint further con-
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2008).
45. Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670, 309 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting 67 C.J.S. Obstruction of Justice §§ 1, 2
(1978)).
46. Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670, 309 S.E.2d at 462.
47. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 326.
48. Id. at 77, 310 S.E.2d at 328.
49. Id. at 77, 310 S.E.2d at 329.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 78, 310 S.E.2d at 329.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 79, 310 S.E.2d at 329. The term "myocardial infarction" is also commonly known
as a "heart attack." See THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 210 (Mark H. Beers
et al. eds., Merck Research Laboratories 2d home ed. 2003) (1997).
55. Deen, 310 N.C. at 79, 310 S.E.2d at 329.
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tended that the defendants agreed to alter decedent's medical records
to prevent the administrator from discovering the negligent acts of
Deen and Hall. 6 The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the claim
of civil conspiracy and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the dismissal was in
error.5 8 Noting that the "gravamen of the action is the resultant in-
jury, and not the conspiracy itself," the court opined that the alleged
acts, if found to have occurred, would support a claim of common law
obstruction of justice.5 9
Prior to Grant, the most recent North Carolina case discussing a
civil claim for common law obstruction of justice was Burgess v.
Busby.6" In Burgess, former jurors in a medical malpractice case
brought suit against a physician who was a defendant in the case.61
The jurors alleged that the physician, after being found guilty of medi-
cal malpractice, sent a letter to the sole hospital in Rowan County.62
In the letter, the physician identified the jurors by name and address,
and labeled them as individuals who had found a doctor guilty.63 The
jurors alleged that the physician's actions constituted, among other of-
fenses, common law obstruction of justice.64 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals opined that the allegations of the complaint suffi-
ciently stated a claim for common law obstruction of justice.65
Of important note in Kivett and Deen is the fact that the allegations
of common law obstruction of justice arose from conduct of the de-
fendants that took place while they were on notice of potential law-
suits.66 Kivett and Deen are the only two such cases that have been
reviewed by the Supreme Court prior to Grant. Burgess, as a Court of
Appeals case, is persuasive but not binding precedent for the Supreme
Court. Therefore, prior to Grant, the Supreme Court has found a po-
tential tort claim for common law obstruction of justice only where
the defendant's actions hindered a pending suit.67 After Grant, it is up
to the Supreme Court to decide whether a tort claim for common law
56. Id. at 79, 310 S.E.2d at 329-30.
57. Id. at 80, 310 S.E.2d at 330.
58. Id. at 90, 310 S.E.2d at 336.
59. Id. at 87, 310 S.E.2d at 334.
60. Burgess v. Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 544 S.E.2d 4 (2001).
61. Id. at 396, 544 S.E.2d at 6.
62. Id. at 397, 544 S.E.2d at 6.
63. Id. at 398, 544 S.E.2d at 6.
64. Id. at 407, 544 S.E.2d at 12.
65. Id. at 409, 544 S.E.2d at 13.
66. See Deen, 310 N.C. at 86-88, 310 S.E.2d at 334-35; Kivett, 309 N.C. at 663-65, 309 S.E.2d
at 458-59.
67. See Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 326; Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 309 S.E.2d 442; Grant, 184
N.C. App. 250, 645 S.E.2d 851.
2009]
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obstruction of justice exists in North Carolina, and if so, under what
circumstances.
ANALYSIS
In the future, if the Supreme Court follows the decision of the
Court of Appeals, it will broaden the scope of tort liability in North
Carolina. The Court of Appeals' decision would allow a civil claim for
common law obstruction of justice to survive where a person does
"any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders public or legal
justice," regardless of whether suit is pending.68 The actions of the
Hospital in Grant, if proven true, should be followed by legal conse-
quences. Hospitals and other organizations that have a duty to keep
records should not be able to evade legal action by destroying evi-
dence of their wrongful acts prior to suit being filed. However, in the
interests of fairness and administrative ease, there should be judi-
cially-created standards for bringing a tort claim for common law ob-
struction of justice.
A civil claim for common law obstruction of justice grounded on
sufficient facts should survive a motion to dismiss.69 As the Supreme
Court noted in Deen, "this State has a policy against parties deliber-
ately frustrating and causing undue expense to adverse parties gather-
ing information about their claims."70 If the Supreme Court allows
the decision in Grant to stand, it will promote the policy that individu-
als who have been legally wronged should have recourse through the
judicial system. Additionally, a tort claim of obstruction would pro-
vide a substitute avenue of relief where a party, by no fault of their
own, cannot meet the statutory requirements to bring a medical mal-
practice action.7'
What is lacking in the Court of Appeals' decision in Grant is some
form of criteria for determining culpability when a tort action for com-
mon law obstruction is litigated. If a claim of obstruction of justice
survives a motion to dismiss, it should be decided using underlying
standards of proof. A sample judicial test may include as elements: 1)
that the defendant knew a proceeding was pending or likely to be in-
stituted against him; 2) that the defendant, with the knowledge of the
pending suit, altered, concealed or destroyed evidence and; 3) that the
68. Grant, 184 N.C. App. at 253, 645 S.E.2d at 853 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 257, 645 S.E.2d at 856.
70. Deen, 310 N.C. at 87, 310 S.E.2d at 334.
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 1A-l, Rule 9(j) (2008).
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defendant acted with the intention to impair the value or availability
of the evidence in a suit against him.72
Applying this proposed test to the facts of Grant, the Court of Ap-
peals correctly held that Grant's claim for common law obstruction of
justice was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. First, the Hospi-
tal was on notice of a potential medical negligence claim.73 When
Grant's attorney initially contacted the Hospital, she specifically
stated that she represented the decedent's estate with respect to a po-
tential medical negligence claim.74 Grant alleged that the Hospital "in-
tentionally and/or recklessly destroyed" decedent's records after being
placed on notice of a potential malpractice action. 75 Based on these
facts, Grant's complaint was sufficient to state a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted under the theory of common law obstruction of
justice.76
As previously stated, a tort action for obstruction would, in effect,
create an alternate avenue to bring a medical malpractice action. A
question arises, then, with regard to the availability of damages in
such a suit. While a discussion of the full scope of damages is too
broad for this note, a few considerations are worthy of mention. The
damages sought in Grant included all of the actual damages that could
have been awarded in a successful suit for wrongful death and medical
malpractice.77 It would logically follow that, in order to receive such
damages in a tort action for obstruction, the plaintiff would have to
prove that they would have prevailed in medical malpractice and
wrongful death actions. This would ultimately lead to a "case within a
case," and could potentially result in claims being decided based upon
speculation about the results of a (nonexistent) prior suit. It appears
as though a civil trial for common law obstruction of justice would
closely resemble a trial for attorney malpractice. 78 The extent of
available damages should be left to the sound discretion of the Su-
preme Court, or, in the alternative, the legislature.
72. 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 31 (2008) (explaining that the sample test could be ap-
plied in cases regarding suppression of evidence and modified for other categories of proceed-
ings not codified in the North Carolina General Statutes).
73. Grant, 184 N.C.App. at 251, 645 S.E.2d at 852.
74. Id. (hospital arguing in its petition for discretionary review that the notice solely per-
tained to potential claims against third parties).
75. Id. at 252, 645 S.E.2d at 853.
76. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-i, Rule 12(b)(6) (2008).
77. Grant, 184 N.C. App. at 252, 645 S.E.2d at 853 (involving petitioner seeking compensa-
tory and punitive damages).
78. See generally Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 361, 329 S.E.2d 355, 369 (1985) (describing
the elements of a successful attorney malpractice claim, including a showing that the original
claim would have resulted in a judgment in the plaintiff's favor).
20091
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CONCLUSION
The emerging jurisprudence in North Carolina on the propriety of a
tort action for common law obstruction of justice in this area rests
with the decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Grant v.
High Point Reg'l Health Sys. 79 Following the decision in Grant, hospi-
tals and other professional organizations will be held to an even
higher level of accountability than they are currently subject to. This
accountability is warranted, however, by the fact that a tort claim for
common law obstruction would survive only where it could be proven
that the defendant intentionally acted to thwart the administration of
public justice.
A tort action for common law obstruction of justice would be con-
sistent with prior decisions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals as
well as the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 0 The availability of
this action would discourage individuals who may otherwise attempt
to avoid a malpractice suit by concealing or destroying any evidence
of their own fault.
When the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals renders deci-
sions on this issue in the future, they should not come without instruc-
tion. The courts should acknowledge the tort action, adding judicial
direction to ensure that the claim can be fairly litigated based upon
coherent requirements.
79. See Grant, 184 N.C. App. 250, 645 S.E.2d 851. After the decision by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina holding that discretionary of the decision in Grant was improvidently granted,
the appellant in the case moved for a voluntary dismissal on remand, which was granted. Notice
of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, Grant v. High Point Reg'l Health Sys., No. 04 CVS 3885 (Jan. 9,
2009).
80. See Busby, 142 N.C. App. 393, 544 S.E.2d 4; see also Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 309 S.E.2d
442.
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